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Research Interest

Econometrics, Networks, Industrial Organization

Employment

2021 - 22	Postdoc, Institute of Economics and Econometrics, GSEM, Université de Genève

Education

2021	Ph.D., Economics, Cornell University *Committee:* Francesca Molinari (Chair), Larry Blume, David Easley, Jörg Stoye
2018	M.A., Economics, Cornell University
2015	M.Sc., Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, London School of Economics
2014	B.Sc., Economics, University of Warwick

References

Francesca Molinari
H. T. Warshow and Robert Irving Warshow Professor
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Lawrence Blume
Goldwin Smith Professor of Economics
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Research

Working Papers

"Optimal Treatment Assignment Rules on Networked Populations" (Job Market Paper) [Link]

I study the problem of optimally distributing treatments among individuals on a network in the presence of spillovers in the effect of treatment across linked individuals. In this paper, I consider the problem of a planner who needs to distribute of a limited number of preventative treatments (e.g., vaccines) for a deadly infectious disease among individuals in a target village in order to maximize population welfare. Since the planner does not know the extent of spillovers or the heterogeneity in treatment effects, she uses data coming from an experiment conducted in a separate pilot village. By placing restrictions on how others' treatments affect one's outcome on the contact network, I derive theoretical limits on how the data from the experiment could be used to best allocate the treatments when the planner observes the contact network structure in both the target and pilot village. For this purpose, I extend the empirical welfare maximization (EWM) procedure to derive an optimal statistical treatment rule. Under restrictions on the shape of the contact network, I provide finite sample bounds for the uniform regret (a measure of the effectiveness of a treatment rule). The main takeaway is that the uniform regret associated with EWM, extended to account for spillovers, converges to 0 at the parametric rate as the size of the pilot experiment grows. I also show that no statistical treatment rule admits a faster rate of convergence for the uniform regret, suggesting that the EWM procedure is rate-optimal.

"Who pays? Inefficiencies Arising from Pressure in Joint Liability Lending Microfinance Programs" [Link]

In this paper, I present a game theoretic model of Joint Liability Lending (JLL) microfinance programs with endogenous peer pressure to repay. I also describe a role for institutional pressure applied by microfinance institutions (MFI). This model helps better explain two important empirical findings in the literature. Firstly, observed repayment rates in not-for-profit microfinance programs are very high. Secondly, the productive capacity of participants does not significantly increase. The most striking finding is that when (risk-averse) participants can choose between low risk-low reward and high risk-high reward investments, and the MFI prefers to set low interest rates, the resulting equilibrium boasts inefficiently high repayment rates. This inefficiently transfers the burden of risk onto the participants who respond by inefficiently choosing low risk-low reward investments. Thus, counter to the main purpose of these programs of poverty alleviation, this model suggest that growth generating investments (high risk-high reward) are left under funded in equilibrium.

Work-in-Progress

"Sharp Identified Regions for Network Formation Games with Bounded Depth and Degree" with Francesca Molinari.

"Optimal Seeding of Office Lite on Collaborator Network" with Francesca Molinari and Sida Peng.

"The Effect of Evictions in the Azure Spot Market" with Francesca Molinari, Sida Peng and Will Wang.

Relevant Work Experience

2020	Research Intern, Microsoft Research, Seattle, Washington, USA - Reduced form analysis of the response of consumers to eviction events - Structural model for bidding behavior on platform
2013	Intern, Energy Aspects, London, UK - Time series analysis of long run oil demand in China and India - Non-parametric regressions for regional oil demand forecasting

Research Assistance Experience

Spring 2019	Research Assistant for Jörg Stoye, Cornell University
Summer 2014	Research Assistant for Greg Fischer, LSE

Teaching Experience

Spring 2022	Python for Economists	Short Course	Université de Genève
Spring 2021	Micro Theory II (graduate)	TA to Larry Blume (Evals: 4.6)	Cornell University
Fall 2020	Networks (undergraduate)	TA to David Easley (Evals: NA)	Cornell University
Fall 2017, Spring 2018, Fall 2018	Applied Econometrics (undergraduate)	TA to Doug McKee (Evals: 4.5, 4.64, 4.97)	Cornell University
Spring 2017	Econometrics (undergraduate)	TA to Francesca Molinari (Evals: 5)	Cornell University
Fall 2016	Mathematical Economics (graduate)	TA to Bruno Salcedo (Evals 4.4)	Cornell University
Fall 2014, Spring 2015	Economics B (ndergraduate)	TA to Francesco Caselli (Evals: NA)	LSE

All teaching evaluations are available here. [Link]

Fellowships, Honors, and Awards

2020	Howard and Abby Milstein Graduate Teaching Assistantship, Cornell University
2020	Michael Brunn Family Goldman Sachs Scholarship, Cornell University
2018	L.R. “Red" Wilson MA ‘67 Excellence in Economics Medal, Cornell University

2018	Tapan Mitra Economics Prize, Cornell University
2017	Howard and Abby Milstein Graduate Teaching Award, Cornell University
2015 - 2020	Sage Fellowship, Cornell University
2015	IATL Fellowship for the International Conference of Undergraduate Research, University of Warwick
2015	Best Spoken Presentation at the British Conference of Undergraduate Research, University of Warwick

Conference and Seminar Presentations

2022	*Seminar*, University of Bonn, Bonn
2022	*Seminar*, University of Oxford, Oxford
2022	*Seminar*, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam
2022	*Seminar*, University College London, London
2021	*Seminar*, University of Bern, Bern
2021	*Seminar*, University of Fribourg, Fribourg
2021	*Seminar*, University of Toronto, Toronto
2021	*Presentation*, IIE Research Day, Genève
2021	*Presentation*, EEA-ESEM Virtual, Copenhagen *Optimal Treatment Assignment Rules on Networked Populations*
2019	*Presentation*, North East Universities Development Consortium, Evanston *Who Pays? Inefficiencies Arising from Pressure in Joint Liability Lending Microfinance Programs*
2019	*Presentation*, Western Economic Association International Conference, San Francisco *Effect of Pressure and Monitoring on Repayment and Welfare in Micro-Finance Programs*

Professional Services

2020, 2021, 2022	*Referee*, Review of Economic Studies
2021	*Referee*, Journal of Econometrics
2019	*Discussant*, North East Universities Development Consortium, Evanston. *Increasing Financial Inclusion in the Muslim World: Evidence from a Islamic Finance Marketing Experiment*
2019	*Discussant*, Western Economic Association International Conference, San Francisco. *Trading at the beginning of the trading day is hazardous to individual traders' wealth*
2017, 2018, 2019	*Mentor*, Economics Graduate Student Mentoring Program, Cornell University.

Professional Associations

American Economic Association

Skills

Programming	Python, MATLAB, Stata, R, SQL, LaTeX
Languages	English, Kannada, Hindi, Arabic (basic), French (basic)